The Stumbling Legs of Success

by: ThisDudesArmy

Tue Mar 25, 2008 at 19:09:27 PM EDT

Now, imagine this success as a tripod, supporting the base with three legs:

1. The surge/fifteen month deployments
2. The Sadr Ceasefire
3. Awakening Councils (The 'Concerned Local Nationals')

Any good tripod cannot stand unless all of its legs are strong and sturdy. Let's briefly look at each to check on their current situation.

1. The surge and fifteen month deployments

This is the biggest reason given by administration officials and conservative pundits. Following the bloodiest year in Iraq, violence began to taper all across the country as U.S. troops poured into Baghdad and set up outposts everywhere. The logic went like this: if Americans moved out of their cozy bases and into tiny outposts within the cities, they'd both gain the confidence of the locals and be able to react to violence quicker and more efficiently. There's no arguing that; it does work to a point. But the surge provided a trickle of extra hands over the first few months, not the supposed burst of 30,000 like it was believed. It was a combat brigade at a time, many who were scheduled to come anyway. 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne kicked off the strategy in January 2007, getting to Baghdad a little ahead of schedule. We fortified their first outpost. It was five months later when the full amount filtered in, the last being 3rd ID's combat aviation brigade. As they arrived, many brigades were supposed to rotate home (including mine). The increase helped, but marginally. It was good for Baghdad but contributed to the whack-a-mole effect, sending enemy fighters north and northeast, into Diyala and Nineveh Provinces (the former being the last stronghold for al-Qaeda, the latter being the latest last stronghold). In those places, violence has either increase or stayed the same. They have not seen the same reduction that Baghdad enjoyed for a time. From Baghdad, we chased the fighters to Diyala and its capital, Baqubah.  

Enter the fifteen month deployment, which forced many brigades already in theater to stay an extra three months to overlap combat operations. This was implemented so the surge wouldn't all of a sudden be down many thousands of troops that already fulfilled their twelve month commitment. It was the only way to sustain the current levels, and even brigades coming in were leaving without a full year of dwell time.

Fifteen months is an incredible amount of time to spend in theater, especially with the degraded living conditions and increased danger that outpost living carries with it. The Dwell Time Amendment failed to pass last year, in an attempt to give soldiers the same amount of time at home that they spent at war. Lately, there has been talk of going back to twelve months, but that won't even be decided until this winter.

2. The Sadr Ceasefire

This has been glossed over by the traditional media since the Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced his ceasefire on August 31, 2007. Brandon Friedman has been on point regarding this subject, creating a timeline that shows Sadr's ceasefire mirrors a sudden plummet of American casualties. His ceasefire, originally six months long, was extended in February, but you can't quite tell from the latest protests, sit ins and Iraqi checkpoint takeovers happening recently. Iraqi Army troops have been in quite a few skirmishes in the oil rich town of Basra, a city that is struggling to cope with its loss of British troops and one of the first tests of the Iraqi Army to hold their own ground. It appears that isn't quite happening due to the Sadrists, making demands their comrades are released from prison. Their ceasefire seemed to come at a time when they needed political leverage and become part of the national voice. Now that they're regrouped and redoubled with men and weapons, they might be able to muscle their way into political discourse.

The showdown with al-Sadr has been brewing for months but has accelerated since parliament agreed in February to hold provincial elections by the fall. The U.S. had been pressing for new elections to give Sunnis, who boycotted the last provincial balloting three years ago, a chance for greater power.

Al-Sadr's followers have also been eager for elections, believing they can make significant gains in the oil-rich Shiite south at the expense of Shiite parties with close U.S. ties.

Sadrists have accused rival Shiite parties, which control Iraqi security forces, of engineering the arrests to prevent them from mounting an effective election campaign.

They also complain that few of their followers have been granted amnesty under a new law designed to free thousands held by the Iraqis and Americans.

"The police and army are being used for political goals, while they should be used for the benefits of all the Iraqi people," said Nassar al-Rubaei, leader of the Sadrist bloc in parliament. "If these violations continue, a huge popular eruption will take place that no power on Earth can stop."

Aligned with the Iraqi government, Sadr never hesitated to take on American troops before. The ceasefire seems all but over at this point, in an area not occupied by American troops and only watched by British forces. There's no telling what could happen if this spills out into the whole country.

3. Awakening Councils (The 'Concerned Local Nationals')

My favorite: former murderers of American troops calling a truce to take on other Sunni radicals like al Qaeda in Iraq (or as I call them, al-Qaeda Lite). This was also implemented while I was in Diyala Province. My initial reaction when dealing with these people was that they would ultimately go back to fighting with us when either al Qaeda Lite was ousted or they had enough of us. After all, it was routine for us to accidently kill their members, stupidly waving around AK-47s in the streets. We gave them yellow reflective belts and vests to sort them out, but the killing keeps happening. And they're getting pretty tired of it.

Some are concerned giving a Sunni group power to patrol neighborhoods and recruit new members will throw off the delicate balance of the Sadr ceasefire in a bid for power by the Sunni Awakening groups:

But as the Sons of Iraq increasingly shed blood for the country, they are growing increasingly disenfranchised with the political rewards. Iraqis, including the Awakening Councils, want peace and stability, but as in any form of participatory government, they also want power. In Diyala province recently, members of the Sons of Iraq abandoned their checkpoints in protest of the Iraqi central government's choice for police chief, who happened to be Shiite. That's just one minor example of the swelling tide of political discontent emerging from the Awakening Councils, as many simply see no purpose in continuing the fight as the Awakening came with few rewards. Adding to the complexity is the tenuous cease-fire by the fighters loyal to the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, who many of the Sawha forces fear.

With the Sadr ceasefire unraveling before our eyes, how will this affect the Sunni groups, whose credit to cutting down violence the past year is now in the hands of a radical Shiite cleric? They grudgingly did our bidding when they were getting paid, but even that is an issue. It's not a matter of if they'll turn on us, but when. They promised to continue fighting us, and it'll happen when they've had enough. I shudder to think of the day when our 'allies' turn their guns on our unsuspecting backs.

All three legs of this tripod have a common thread: they all were created in 2007. The administration and commanders have control over only a third, the one they acknowledge the most: the surge and the fifteen month deployment. The other two legs depend largely on our actions but will be decided by men like Sadr and those in control of the Awakening councils. It's not looking good for the other two. Take away one leg and the tripod of success will fall. Unfortunately, it seems that only one leg will be left to support it.